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by Tara Rice, financial economist
The Check Clearing for the 21st Century Act (the Check 21 Act) was designed to facilitate
technological innovation by accelerating the transition to electronic check processing. 
Yet, in adopting Check 21-related processing, banks must also appropriately identify and
mitigate potential risks associated with this new federal law. 
ESSAYS ON ISSUES THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK AUGUST 2005
OF CHICAGO NUMBER 217
Banks are using the authority
under the Check 21 Act to
move gradually to an electronic
check processing paradigm.
The Check Clearing for the 21st Century
Act (the Check 21 Act), effective October
28, 2004, is designed to foster innova-
tion in the payments system and to en-
hance its efficiency by reducing some of
the legal impediments to check trun-
cation.1 It introduces a new negotiable
instrument, called a substitute check,
and makes it the legal equivalent of the
original check. Before the Check 21 Act,
absent an agreement of the paying bank
to take presentment of the check in elec-
tronic form, collecting banks had to send
the original paper check to paying banks.
Since the Check 21 Act became effective,
collecting banks may instead truncate
the original check and, without the pay-
ing bank’s agreement, send a substitute
check to the paying bank.2
A substitute check is a paper reproduc-
tion of an original check that 1) contains
images of both the front and back of the
original check; 2) bears a Magnetic Ink
Character Recognition (MICR) line that,
except as provided under the generally
applicable industry standard for substi-
tute checks, contains all the information
appearing on the MICR line of the origi-
nal check at the time of issue and any
other information encoded in the MICR
line before the image was captured;
3) conforms to the generally applicable
industry standard for substitute checks;
and 4) is suitable for automated process-
ing in the same manner as the original
check. To be the legal equivalent of the
original check, the substitute check also
must accurately represent all the infor-
mation contained on the front and back
of the check at the time the original
check was truncated and must contain
the legend, “This is a legal copy of your
check. You can use it the same way you
would use the original check.” A new
Subpart D of Regulation CC implements
the Check 21 Act by incorporating its
requirements. Subpart D specifies
ANS (American National Standard)
X9.100-140 as the industry standard
for substitute checks.
In this Chicago Fed Letter, I discuss the po-
tential operational risks involved with cre-
ating and transferring substitute checks.
Operational risk is the risk of loss result-
ing from inadequate or failed processes,
people, and systems or from external
events. While banks have traditionally
had processes in place to control specific
operational risks, only recently has this
risk been defined and managed in a sys-
tematic way, comparable to that for cred-
it risk and market risk. The information
in this article has been collected through
an informal survey of banks, discussions
with industry professionals, and a review
of published material on the topic. In
general, the risks identified are not new
risks per se, but variations of risks that
exist with current payment instruments.
Overall, I find that banks are using the
authority granted under the Check 21
Act to move to Check 21-related image
exchange and substitute check creation,
while substitute check standards, securi-
ty features, and bilateral and multilateral
agreements are evolving to address as-
sociated risks. It appears that banks are
appropriately identifying and mitigating
those potential risks.Risk Explanation/definition Average risk rating Solutions offered
Fraud Forgery, counterfeit, and alteration of original High/Medium Fraud detection systems, procedures,
checks, which may not be detectable by looking and software, including positive pay
at a check image or substitute check. and image-survivable security features.
Duplicate debits Multiple copies of the substitute check, Medium Controls at the site of original check
electronic image, and the original check may truncation and image capture, software
be processed by mistake, resulting in duplicate that recognizes duplicate debits, and
debits from the customer’s account. establishment of procedures to detect
multiple printouts of substitute checks.
Poor quality of The warranty in the Check 21 Act states that  Medium Agreements sending warranties
substitute checks responsibility lies with the reconverting bank. upstream or back to the problem
source. Image quality assurance
(IQA); bilateral or multilateral
agreements (clearinghouse rules).
Noncompliance with This provision in the Check 21 Act allows a consumer Low Ensuring that policies and procedures
expedited recredit who receives a substitute check and suffers a loss are in place to handle expedited
provision associated with that check to file an expedited recredit recredit. Provisions in the Check 21
claim with his or her bank.  The bank must recredit Act allow a bank to defer availability
the consumer's account within a limited time period. of the expedited recredit in certain
situations, including recently opened
accounts and multiple overdrafts in a
short time period.
Noncompliance with Subpart D in Regulation CC includes consumer Low Consumer notification following
consumer notification notification and consumer awareness provisions. recommendations in Subpart D in
regulations Regulation CC; employee (teller)
training.
1. Summary of operational risks posed by the Check 21 Act
Benefits of the Check 21 Act
The Check 21 Act was designed to offer
a number of benefits to banks.3 As is well
known, the number of checks written in
the U.S. is declining, resulting in an in-
crease in the cost per unit of processing
the remaining paper checks.4 Despite
the decrease in checks, however, it is un-
likely that U.S. consumers and businesses
will altogether discontinue using checks.
Thus, the financial services industry has
sought alternative methods for process-
ing checks as per unit costs rise. The
substitute check is intended to be an
intermediate step toward a more elec-
tronic check collection system where
banks both send and receive checks elec-
tronically, avoiding relatively expensive
physical collection processes and, eventu-
ally, avoiding the added cost of printing
substitute checks. During the transition
phase, some banks may convert to elec-
tronic check processing, while accommo-
dating other banks (that can only accept
paper checks) by printing out substitute
checks. Check truncation, image ex-
change, and, where necessary, substitute
check creation should reduce costs, de-
lays, and risks associated with infra-
structure costs (e.g., ground and air
transportation); cut down labor costs in
back-office processing (through electron-
ic sorting rather than physical sorting
of checks); and provide faster access
to funds (through decreased processing
time). The Check 21 Act offers a num-
ber of benefits to customers as well—
improved information flow (through
access to online images of deposits) and,
possibly, faster access to deposited funds
(e.g., if banks offer later deposit cutoff
hours for some deposits as a result of the
processing efficiencies gained from the
Check 21 Act).5
Despite the benefits that the Check 21
Act offers, the decision of when and how
to move to substitute check creation un-
der the Check 21 Act is a complicated
one. Banks must decide the extent to
which they wish to expand the use of
electronics in the collection and return
of checks, and their decision on this issue
affects multiple bank functions, technol-
ogy investment decisions, and communi-
cation with banks’ customers. Since the
bank that creates the substitute check
generally bears the cost of substitute
check creation, the bank must weigh
costs of investment in electronic imaging
equipment and substitute check cre-
ation against benefits of eliminating the
physical processing of the original check.
Check processing pre- and post-
Check 21 Act
In traditional check collection, a paper
check is deposited at the bank of first
deposit (BOFD). The BOFD (or a cor-
respondent bank of the BOFD) then
must forward that paper check through
the collection process in order to receive
funds from the paying bank. The paper
check is transported by ground or air
directly to the paying bank, or indirectly
through an intermediary or a number
of intermediaries. When the BOFD is the
same as the paying bank, the check is
considered an “on-us” check that the
bank can clear internally and will not
be cleared through the forward collec-
tion process.6
With Check 21-enabled substitute check
creation, the forward collection process
remains fundamentally the same, but re-
lies less heavily on processing and trans-
portation of the original paper check.
For example, when the original check is
deposited at the BOFD, that bank may
image the original check at the collec-
tion site or transport it to a payment
processor for imaging. The image then
travels electronically to the paying bank
where the image is reprinted as a substi-
tute check. If the paying bank cannot or
does not wish to receive the image, the
image then travels to an intermediary
whose location is close to the paying
bank where the image is used to create
a substitute check for presentment to
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Where we are today
Nine months after the effective date of
the Check 21 Act, banks, as expected,
are using the authority under the Check
21 Act to move gradually to an electronic
check processing paradigm. The Federal
Reserve Banks have not witnessed much
demand by banks to receive image pre-
sentments, but have noticed relatively
strong demand by banks to deposit
checks electronically. Furthermore, while
the volume of substitute checks pro-
cessed by the Federal Reserve Banks is
still low (about 1% of total Fed check
volume), the value of substitute checks
processed is somewhat higher (about
10% of total Fed check value). This sug-
gests that the dollar size of individual
checks is an important consideration for
banks in choosing to move to substitute
check creation. Check imaging may al-
low the sending bank to have quicker
access to funds. A bank may elect to con-
vert a paper check to an image and/or
a substitute check when the float earned
off the earlier availability of funds ex-
ceeds the cost of converting the paper
item (which is now more expensive than
processing the original paper item).
This suggests that as the cost to create
substitute checks comes down (or inter-
est rates rise), the threshold to image the
checks will be reduced, and as a conse-
quence, the number of checks imaged
will increase.
Risks that banks have identified
Figure 1 summarizes the operational
risks identified by survey participants.
It also lists the degree of the risk (low,
medium, high) and potential solutions
to those risks.7
Fraud
Fraud is one of the most often cited risks
of substitute check creation—and the
only risk listed in figure 1 that was identi-
fied as a high/medium risk. The cate-
gory of fraud includes, more specifically,
forgery, counterfeit, and alteration of
original checks, which may not be de-
tectable by looking at a check image or
substitute check. The effect of the Check
21 Act on fraud detection is not yet
known. It could make detection of ex-
isting fraud opportunities more diffi-
cult. Fraud could increase if industry
participants are unaware of the weakness-
es of the newly created substitute checks
and of their own processes and proce-
dures for clearing those checks. Since
the original checks could be destroyed,
traditional security features, such as
watermarks or the texture of the paper,
will no longer be available.
Solutions identified in figure 1 to miti-
gate fraud include quicker processing
time, positive pay systems, and image-
survivable security features. Fraud could
be reduced through faster processing of
checks via electronic transmission. The
longer an item takes to clear, the greater
likelihood of fraud not being detected
prior to funds leaving the banking system,
all else being equal. Also, sending an im-
age (perhaps to be printed as a substitute
check at some point in the process) often
involves fewer “touchpoints” (people that
handle the check), which could also re-
duce the likelihood of fraud.
Positive pay is a common method of
check fraud deterrence available to bank
account holders, generally corporate
customers. The positive pay process en-
tails a daily reconcilement of a company’s
issued checks to checks presented for
payment. Checks presented for payment
at the company’s bank that fail to match
with checks issued by a company are
rejected or placed on a “suspect check”
list, which is delivered to the company
to be resolved before the bank approves
payment on those checks. It is not an-
ticipated that positive pay will be affected
by the Check 21 Act; it will work just as
well with substitute checks as with orig-
inal checks.
To address the loss of the paper check se-
curity features, firms are currently devel-
oping fraud detection and prevention
techniques and shifting the focus of fraud
detection to image-survivable security fea-
tures. However, image-survivable security
features will be most effective when they
can be used to prevent fraudulent items
from entering the banking system in the
first place. This requires that banks share
the security features so that these safe-
guards can be verified at the point of de-
posit. Currently, multiple image-survivable
security features are being used by banks.
To enable verification of security features
at the point of deposit, some organizations
are examining ways to make image-surviv-
able security features interoperable across
multiple banks.
Duplicate debits
Duplicate debits, or double posting,
occurs when a customer’s account is
debited more than once for the same
check, (e.g., if a bank charged a substi-
tute check [or image] as well as the orig-
inal check.) Figure 1 identifies this as a
medium risk. A customer’s account will
be debited for both items, which could
result in an overdraft on a customer’s
account. Duplicate debits could occur
either through fraud or error. One solu-
tion to this potential problem is to de-
velop and install software that detects
duplicate debits at a bank before it debits
funds from a customer’s account. Inter-
mediary banks could also install dupli-
cate debit detection software to prevent
duplicate files from being forwarded to
the paying banks. Another solution is
to ensure that procedures are in place
to detect multiple printouts of substi-
tute checks.
Poor quality of substitute check
The Check 21 Act provides that, to be the
legal equivalent of the original check, a
substitute check must accurately repre-
sent the information on the front and
back of the original check at the time that
the original check was truncated. If a sub-
stitute check does not satisfy this require-
ment, the law places responsibility for
associated losses on the reconverting
bank,8 even if the substitute check result-
ed from a poor quality image that the re-
converting bank received from another
party. A poor quality substitute check is
listed as a medium risk in figure 1. The1 The author thanks Joe Baressi, Bob
Chakravorti, Tom Ciesielski, Geoff Gerdes,
Dick Porter, Adrianne Threatt, Jeff Vetterick,
Jack Walton, Joe Wicklander, and David
Walker for comments and suggestions.
2 Check truncation is the process of stop-
ping the paper check before it gets to the
paying bank.
3 A bank here generally refers to any deposit-
taking institution.
solution to insulate reconverting banks
from the liability for a poor quality substi-
tute check that results from a poor quality
image captured by another bank is to
establish bilateral or multilateral agree-
ments (such as those in clearinghouses)
to allow the warranty (or liability) to flow
upstream to the party that created the
poor image. These agreements are occur-
ring rapidly. Another solution is for indus-
try standards to evolve to address image
quality issues. Finally, the solution to pre-
venting transfer of a poor quality substi-
tute image is to develop and install image
quality control software at the point of
image capture.
Consumer regulation noncompliance
The Check 21 Act contains two provisions
intended to protect consumers. Both
provisions are identified in figure 1 as
low risk. The first provision is the expe-
dited recredit provision, which allows a
consumer who receives a substitute check
and suffers a loss associated with that
check to file an expedited recredit claim
with his or her bank if he or she needs
the original check (or a better copy) to
show that the claim is valid. The expedit-
ed recredit provision establishes time
frames within which a bank must act on
a consumer’s claim and sets forth a bank’s
options for handling the claim. This
provision includes the criteria a bank
must satisfy to deny a claim and describes
the rules for making a recredit if a bank
does not deny the claim. While the ex-
pedited recredit provision is complicat-
ed, banks can control risks related to
handling expedited recredit claims by
ensuring that their procedures adhere
to the regulations.
The second consumer-specific provision
requires banks to provide a disclosure
to consumers in certain circumstances.
This disclosure must explain that a sub-
stitute check is the legal equivalent of the
original check and describe the consum-
er expedited recredit right. The Check
21 Act requires the Federal Reserve
Board to publish a model form that a
bank could use to comply with this dis-
closure requirement and provides that
appropriate use of the Board’s model
form would serve as a safe harbor.9  Com-
pliance with the consumer notification
provision requires that the bank either
establish its own acceptable forms or use
the Board’s “safe harbor” model forms.
Employee training for both consumer
provisions is also recommended for banks
as a solution to ensure compliance with
these provisions.
Conclusion
The Check 21 Act has already begun to
spur changes in check processing in the
U.S. Benefits that are expected to accrue
to banks include reduced infrastructure
and back-office processing costs as well
as decreased processing time. Customers
are also expected to benefit through im-
proved information flow and possibly
quicker access to deposited funds. How-
ever, the banking industry has identified
a number of operational issues associated
with Check 21-related image exchange
and substitute check creation. The risks
identified are generally not new risks,
but variations of existing risks in payments
processing. It appears that banks are
appropriately identifying and mitigating
those potential risks. Finally, as originally
envisioned, it appears that the Check 21
Act is indeed facilitating technological
innovation by accelerating the transition
to electronic check processing as banks
move to Check 21-related image ex-
change and substitute check creation.
4 See Federal Reserve Payments Study, 2004,
available at www.frbservices.org/Retail/pdf/
2004PaymentResearchReport.pdf.
5 Banks are not required to pass on improved
funds availability to customers. However,
the Check 21 Act requires that the Federal
Reserve Board studies and reports on
funds availability by April 2007.
6 Currently, about 24% of all checks pro-
cessed in the U.S. are “on-us” checks.
7 See Paul Kellogg, 2003, “Evolving opera-
tional risk management for retail payments,”
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, work-
ing paper, No. S&R-2003-1E.
8 The reconverting bank is generally the
bank that creates a substitute check.
9 The Board’s model form is model C-5A in
Appendix C to Subpart D of Regulation CC.